Category: Joining the EU

As soon as the decision is made that Scotland will become an independent country, we must ensure we’re ready to apply to join the EU from day one of independence. Below, we set out Yes for EU’s position on the process for independent Scotland to join the EU.

Yes for EU asserts that there already exists a strong mandate for the Scottish Government to start negotiations for EU membership as soon as Scotland becomes independent: in the 2016 Brexit referendum Scots voted by a majority of 62% to 38% to remain. Polls continue to demonstrate an even stronger majority in favour of Scotland’s EU membership (e.g. Survation poll). In every Scottish Parliament since 2016, there has been a pro-EU majority of MSPs, elected on pro-EU manifestoes, and a similar situation is anticipated for the next Parliament from 2026 onwards. The democratic will of the people of Scotland will therefore be clearly demonstrated, and thus a mandate for the government of an independent Scotland to proceed without delay with negotiations towards an EU accession treaty. 

Should a future independence referendum be held, we would call for strong and highly publicised commitment from the pro-independence parties to seek EU membership for Scotland as soon as independence is achieved. This will be vital to build confidence among the 70% of Scots who want to be back in the EU.

Once Scottish people have chosen independence in a future referendum, or via another democratic mechanism (such as a general election), following that “Decision Day” the Scottish Government should immediately begin preparations for EU accession. These could include preliminary work on the accession process, whether via an association agreement or other route, so that the basis for the accession treaty is being drawn up at the same time as the withdrawal from the UK is negotiated; formal negotiations for EU membership cannot take place until Scotland is an independent sovereign state, but pre-independence informal engagement with the EU, in various forms, would not be unusual. This would allow Scotland to gain rapid access to some EU benefits, including the single market, following “Independence Day” (i.e. day one of independence). There may be a transition period of a few months. Pre-independence preparatory work will also facilitate speedy conclusion of the accession treaty itself.

Some argue that the pre-independence Scottish Government should plan for a separate Yes/No or EU/EFTA referendum on EU membership at some point after Independence Day. This would be unnecessary, given the existing mandate, and also inadvisable: in EU eyes, it would cast doubt on Scotland’s commitment, and would delay membership, creating protracted uncertainty for Scottish businesses and society. It would mean Scotland spending a year or more in limbo, outwith both the UK and the EU, which would be highly detrimental for trade and the overall economy.

Instead, we advocate pre-independence preparations and engagement as outlined above, so that on Independence Day – perhaps 1-2 years after Decision Day – the Scottish Government will be ready to immediately make the formal application to become a candidate for EU membership as a sovereign state, and enjoy pre-accession benefits. Updates on progress towards accession should be openly and widely shared so that the Scottish public are kept well-informed. Once a Scotland-EU accession treaty has been negotiated, a referendum seeking Scots’ approval on the accession deal – though not an EU requirement – could be a good final step to show there is strong public support. Many previous new member countries have adopted this process. Whether or not such a referendum is held, all EU member states will have to ratify the treaty for it to come into effect. Estimates of the period of time from Independence Day to full EU membership range from about 2 – 5 years. 

Kirsty Hughes| 6 March 2020

This is a joint SCER-University College London European Institute Policy Paper. It has been written in the context of the research and policy engagement project “Small states in the EU, lessons from Scotland”, led by the Scottish Centre on European Relations’ 2019-2020 in collaboration with the University College London European Institute under their Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence Programme 2019-2022, co-funded by the European Commission’s Erasmus+ Programme.

Download the full paper here

Executive Summary and Key Conclusions

This paper analyses how smaller EU member states develop their European strategies and tactics, set priorities and build alliances, and sets out some lessons for Scotland’s European strategy. Overall, smaller and medium-sized member states can be influential in the EU but that requires a pro-active, carefully developed strategic approach. The paper draws on a set of interviews with diplomats and officials in smaller EU member states, the European Commission and the Scottish government.

Brexit Impact:

The UK’s departure from the EU has had substantial impact on the diverse and shifting alliances that characterise today’s Union. Many smaller states are reconsidering their approach to alliance-formation and networking both in general and in particular policy areas as a result. The internal market is one of the main areas where the UK’s departure has led to a re-think, especially amongst those states who were ‘like-minded’ with the UK on the internal market. But, more widely, the UK’s departure, having been one of the ‘big three’ in the EU, changes the power politics and networks across the 27.

Key Strategies and Tactics:

There are few policy areas where smaller EU states are on one side of a policy debate and the larger states (the big five of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain) on the other. But smaller states want to have influence on the direction, and the detail, of EU policies and defend their interests. This requires a pro-active strategy, building alliances with states large and small – a strategy that goes beyond formal participation in EU institutions, vital though that is. Bringing expertise, getting views in early, proposing solutions not bringing problems, being alert to other member states’ priorities, looking for compromises, being persistence and investing resources in Brussels and in bilateral EU relationships, all this and more is how many smaller EU states look to participate in EU policy-formation and decision-making.

Informal Groupings:

With 27 member states, the EU can find it hard in some areas to get to consensus. Informal, like-minded groupings of member states – that may put in letters or statements ahead of summits, coordinate on positions and so on – are now common within the EU. There are like-minded groups on climate change and on the internal market, as well as ones clearly seen in the current EU budget debate, together with older and newer groupings such as the Visegrad 4 and the New Hanseatic League. These groupings can help drive policy forward and reach consensus, but used in too rigid a way, they can create blockage and division.

Climate and Industrial Strategy Leadership:

In the core areas of the European Green Deal and the debate over a new industrial strategy, smaller member states have been very active with the aim of influencing where these vital issues go next – Finland played a big role in its presidency at the end of 2019, and Sweden and Denmark are also seen as influential players in climate policy. The Netherlands, meanwhile, is seen generally as an important medium-sized player and one that may take up some of the free market leadership role previously played by the UK.

Lessons for Scotland:

There is much for Scotland to learn here despite being a sub-state within a third country, the UK, outside of the EU. It will be hard for Scotland to influence future EU developments from the outside. But bringing expertise, building long-standing bilateral relationships, participating in debates and stepping in early and constructively – whether in its current status as a sub-state within the UK or in future, perhaps, as an independent state in the EU – will all pay dividends.

Even if the European Union and the United Kingdom conclude a highly ambitious partnership covering all areas agreed in the Political Declaration by the end of 2020, the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU acquis, the internal market and the Customs Union, at the end of the transition period will inevitably create barriers to trade and cross-border exchanges that do not exist today. There will be broad and far-reaching consequences for public administrations, businesses and citizens as of 1 January 2021, regardless of the outcome of negotiations. These changes are unavoidable and stakeholders must make sure they are ready for them. To assist, the Commission is reviewing – and where necessary updating – the over 100 sector-specific stakeholder preparedness notices it published during the Article 50 negotiations with the United Kingdom.

Those notices that have already been updated as ‘notices for readiness’ can be found underneath.

Readiness notices

Air transport Animal breeding (zootechnics) Animal transport Aviation safety Chemicals (REACH) Consumer protection and passenger rights Cosmetic products Excise duties European Works Councils Feed Food law Genetically-modified organisms Industrial products Medicinal products (human use, veterinary) Movements of live animals Natural mineral waters Online purchase with subsequent parcel delivery Organic products Plant health Value added tax (VAT) – goods

If the European Union and the United Kingdom fail to reach an agreement by 31 December 2020, the changes at the end of the transition period would be even more far-reaching.

For more information, go to the European Union and the United Kingdom – Forging a new partnership